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Abstract Contrary to fi ndings reported in the extant IPO literature between 2001 and 2006, 
average first-day returns in Israel’s stock market resulted in a deficit return of −1.2% and 
the average one-year return resulted in an excess return of 10.5%. Estimating the relationship 
between yields and various explanatory variables, we found that daily yield is positively 
affected by excess demand and total equity capital, whilst negatively correlated with 
underwriting commissions, price of offerings and the total sum raised. The one-year return was 
found to be positively correlated with defi cient underwriting and negatively correlated with 
fi rst-day return and return on capital.
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Rentabilidad inicial y anual en ofertas públicas de activos en Israel durante los años 
1998-2006
Resumen Contrariamente a las conclusiones halladas en la literatura existente sobre las 
Ofertas Públicas Iniciales entre 2001 y 2006, el promedio de rentabilidad el primer día en la 
Bolsa de Valores de Israel resultó en un défi cit de −1,2%, mientas que el promedio anual de 
rentabilidad fue del 10,5%. Estimando la relación entre los rendimientos y las diversas variables 
explicativas, llegamos a la conclusión de que el rendimiento inicial está afectado positivamente 
por el exceso de demanda y el capital total, y correlacionado negativamente con las comisiones 
de suscripción, el precio de las ofertas y el importe total recaudado. Se demostró que la ren-
tabilidad anual estaba correlacionada positivamente con la suscripción defi ciente y nega ti-
vamente con la rentabilidad inicial y la rentabilidad sobre el capital. 
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is the fi rst sale of stock by a pri-
vate fi rm to the public (Cliff & Denis, 2004). IPO’s are of-
ten issued by smaller, nascent companies, seeking capital to 
expand, but they are also common amongst large, priva-
tely-owned companies willing to become publicly traded 
(Ghosh, 2001).
In an IPO, the issuer obtains the assistance of underwri-
ters in determining what category of security to issue (com-
mon or preferred), the timing of bringing it to the market, 
and the best offering price (Marrison, 2002).
Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that between 
1990-1998, 3,025 US fi rms invested over 27 billion dollars in 
order to become publicly traded. This phenomenon has 
attracted many authors who have over the years attempted 
to explain it. Ritter (2003) for instance, found that the 
average first day yield of IPOs in the USA was 15.8%. 
According to this analysis, the average annual yield of all 
IPOs in the USA in most years was positive. Stability in 
excess fi rst-day yields is the main reason for the scholarly as 
well as hands-on analysts’ interest in this phenomenon. This 
phenomenon is not unique to the USA and according to 
Ritter (2003) typifi es other countries. First day yields varied 
from 5.4% in Denmark (Hale & Santos, 2006) to 257% in 
China (Kao et al., 2009) with a median of 18.4% and 20.7% 
average yields for all nations.
Authors have raised several reasons for under-pricing. 
Akerlof (1970) was amongst the first to investigate this 
phenomenon suggesting that in cases of asymmetric 
information between sellers and buyers, buyers request a 
discount on the product cost because they are apprehensive 
lest they purchase an inferior product. Consequently, 
discount on initial issuance, results in under-pricing that 
generates, in turn excess fi rst day yields. Later, Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) hypothesized that firms’ under-pricing 
prior to initial issuance indicates the firm’s financial 
robustness.
A model in which executives elect to generate 
under-pricing in initial issue thus creating excess fi rst-day 
yield in order to generate a momentum of positive 
information, is offered by Aggarwal et al. (2002b). This 
positive momentum is engendered by higher media interest 
and analysts’ coverage because both prefer to deal with 
firms that display the most extreme performance. This 
positive momentum will push prices upwards, thus enable 
the selling of shares in prices higher than the price they 
would have received had they sold their shares during the 
initial issue even if it had been executed by quoting higher 
prices. Owners, according to Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), 
decide about the first-day yield indirectly in accordance 
with their holdings in the company and the number of shares 
they wish to issue. Owners may opt for a highly reputed 
underwriter and hence reduce under-pricing (Demers & 
Joos, 2007), but this would normally raise fees. In case 
owners decide to issue a small portion of the company 
shares, the cost of under-pricing is likely to be lower than 
the cost of qualitative underwriting. Pertinently, Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) hypothesize that during the hi-tech 
bubble, owners chose to issue a relatively small number of 
the company shares at lower prices expecting to sell their 
shares following a noticeable upswing in share prices prior 
to the end of the ‘hot market’. These activities were fuelled 
by analysts’ optimistic forecasts according to Brous, Datar 
and Kini (2009), and traders who prodded their customers to 
purchase shares. Lowry and Schwert (2004), argue in this 
vein that not updating the price of offers according to the 
accumulated information prior to issue does not amount to 
inefficiency on the part of underwriters since price 
adjustment is undertaken by investors. The impact of 
information available to the public on first day yields is 
negligible (Alexander et al., 2000). A thorough examination 
of the US market between 1980-2003 (Loughran & Ritter, 
2004) shows that fi rst-day yields fl uctuate dramatically bet-
ween periods such that a yield of 7% in the 1980s doubled to 
15% in the 1990s, reaching an all-time high of 65% between 
1999-2000 (internet bubble) following which yields dropped 
to just 12%. Additionally, during the Internet bubble the 
percentage of managerial ownership in their firms rose 
twofold, apparently because they attempted to generate a 
positive momentum in order to realize their holdings at 
a better price (Boyer, 2005).
An example of this exuberance is the large fi rst-day yields 
to Internet IPOs, which averaged over 80% (Loughran & Rit-
ter, 2004). However, 88% of Internet companies reported 
negative earnings in the year prior to their IPO, 91% of these 
fi rms had accumulated defi cits, and many Internet fi rms did 
not even have revenues at the time of their IPOs (Bhatta-
charya et al., 2009: 4)
Another explanation for excess yields during the bubble 
years is that raising under-pricing was in fact an indirect 
payment for underwriters who increased issue coverage in 
financial markets. This pertained mostly to unprofitable 
startups that issued during the bubble years (Dolvin & Pyles, 
2009; Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003).
Hanleya and Wilhelm (1995) argued that the main 
benefactors from short-term excess yields arising from 
initial issue are institutional investors who are often favored 
by underwriters. On top of the increased profi t, institutional 
investors are expected to partake in ‘inferior’ issue, hence 
inferior issue are subsidised by more profitable ones. A 
positive relationship was found by Aggarwal et al. (2002a) 
between institutional investors and fi rst-day yield. Part of 
this association is explained by the allocation of more sha-
res to institutional investors in initial issuance typifi ed by 
high early demand and the fact that these investors have 
valuable information that prompts them to take part in suc-
cessful issue. 
Much like in excess fi rst-day yields, underperformed yield 
is expected in the long-run (Ritter, 1998). Long-term under-
performed yield has been common in most countries over a 
considerable length of time. For instance, Ritter (1991) 
found that IPOs had under-performing yield that equalled 
83.1% of the average market yield.
Under-performing yield mostly characterizes IPOs in years 
of highly active IPO market. This is because investors tend 
to be optimistic at certain times concerning nascent fi rms’ 
income potential and these fi rms tend to capitalise on these 
windows of opportunity. 
Exploring long-term yields, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) 
found over-optimism accompanying IPOs as shown by excess 
yields which decline thereafter into under-performing yield. 
A later study, however (Eckbo & Norli, 2005) investigating 
NASDAQ IPOs between 1973-2002, shows that considering 
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the firms’ risk and financial leverage factors IPOs’ yields 
equal market yields. 
Pastor et al. (2006) studied 7,183 IPOs in the USA between 
1975-2004. They found that, on average, fi rms’ profi tability 
declines following IPO and further, this decline was more 
significant amongst firms characterized by fluctuating 
profi tability. Pastor et al. (2006) argue that the owners elect 
to undertake IPO at the zenith of their fi rms’ profi tability 
when they sense a looming decline. Owners gain highest 
yield on their holdings when selling the company whilst it is 
most profi table notably in light of an expected decline in its 
market capitalization (Zingales, 1995). 
Pagano et al. (1998) indicated that the probability for 
a fi rm’s IPOs is positively associated with the value of other 
fi rms of the same industry. This relationship is explained by 
the owners attempt to take advantage of erroneous pricing 
for the firm’s market capitalization which is evidently 
affected by the relevant industry’s trends in the market.
Cyclicality of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets is widely discussed 
in the finance literature (cf. Derrien, & Womack, 2003; 
Freybote, Rottke & Schiereck, 2008). A hot market is char-
acterised according to Ljungqvist, Vikram and Singh (2006) 
by an excess of IPOs and continuous upsurge of trade indica-
tors and volumes. Conventionally, a fi rm’s decision concer-
ning IPO timing is motivated by its willingness to minimize 
errors in its pricing (Alti, 2005). A hot market eventuates as 
a result of the confl uence of several characteristics each of 
which is crucial in determining the value of fi rms. Available 
information and reduced uncertainty make IPOs less costly 
for upcoming companies (Lee, Bach & Baik, 2011). High 
offers for breakthrough companies induce additional IPOs. 
As time goes by, however, the quality of firms opting for 
IPOs in hot markets tend to decline.
As a whole, firms undertaking IPOs do so regardless of 
market conditions only for the sake of investment whilst 
firms opting for IPOs in hot markets do so in order to 
capitalize on the unique market circumstances amenable 
for mobilizing funds that are used mostly to service existing 
debt. In this vein, Benninga et al. (2005) indicate that fi rms 
tend to issue when share prices are high and this refl ects 
the existence of same industry IPO aggregates. In contrast, 
when shares prices are low, fi rms tend to repurchase shares 
with the view of going public.
In accordance with the classic model, Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2004) found that in times of low interest rates 
fi rms are predisposed to delay IPOs.
2. The Israeli scene
There are several reasons making the IPO market in Israel 
unique. First, compared with most other developed econo-
mies the Israeli IPO market is typifi ed with disproportionally 
high number of hi-tech fi rms (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2004). 
In general the Israeli money market is globally oriented and 
subsequently many Israeli hi-tech fi rms (and others) are tra-
ded both domestically and in foreign stock exchanges nota-
bly NASDAQ (Hashai, 2011). Also, most Israeli companies 
involved in IPO’s, invest heavily in R&D (Blass & Yafeh, 
2001).
The Israeli money market has been structurally reformed 
such that as of 2006 ownership and management of provi-
dent, mutual and pension funds and underwriting were se-
parated from the banks. This reform has enhanced 
competition of the public’s fi nancial assets by developing 
alternative investment vehicles to those offered by banks, 
and by decentralising the management of existing invest-
ment vehicles. It has also augmented competition in credit 
provision by developing non-bank credit instruments (So-
koler, 2006: 250). This structural reform constitutes an inte-
gral part of a comprehensive set of governmental policies 
designed to engender a more competitive and effi cient cap-
ital market. These policies include the sale of new pension 
funds, the downsizing of issues of “earmarked” bonds (e.g. 
long governmental bonds with guaranteed yields), the 
equalization of tax rates on capital gains from foreign secu-
rities with those on domestic securities, and others (Ministry 
of Finance, 2004).
Consequently, we argue that IPO’s in Israel are closely 
linked to the aforementioned structural reform that has al-
tered taxing and so the Israeli market is evidently exposed 
to foreign money markets. When an Israeli or foreign fi rm 
does IPO the price it gets in the issuing is closer to the fi rm’s 
real value, thus the Israeli IPO market is potentially attrac-
tive to foreign fi rms as they are likely to get a higher price 
at IPO’s. 
This study aims at measuring and explaining first-day 
yields and yearly yield in Israel. First-day yield is defi ned as 
the rate of change in the price of issuance unit on the fi rst 
day following issuance where this yield is adjusted to the 
share index. Yearly yield is defi ned as the rate of change 
in share price as of the end of the fi rst business day until a 
year after business has begun (McLean, Pontiff & Watanabe, 
2009). 
The sampled period, (January 2001-April 2006), is unique 
in terms of the Israel Stock Exchange as the General Share 
Index rose by over 200%, commensurate with a noticeable 
growth in trade volume. Moreover, that period earmarks the 
high-tech bubble when the Tel-Tech grew 4.5 times then de-
clined below the 1999-2001 baseline. 
Our study is the fi rst to examine this unique period in 
Israel and it extends the number of parameters measured 
compared with previous studies addressing the Israeli 
scene.
Considerable differences exist between the 1980s and the 
2000s with respect to periods of fi rst-day yields. Barniv and 
Chen (1986) found the concrete yields at the fi rst week of 
trade to be 42%. Amihud et al (2003) report that in the early 
1990s, average fi rst-day yield was 12%. Thus far, no study 
has explored more recent data. 
We will provide information regarding first-day rate of 
yield and will explain changes in the fi rst-day yields with 
respect to changes in the Israeli Stock Exchange and the 
IPOs market in particular.
3. Type of tenders
Two types of tenders are common in Israel, tender on price 
and on fi xed price.
Kandel et al. (1999) using Dec. 1993 and Dec. 1996 data 
found that under the fi xed price tender, fi rst day yields are 
lower compared to the price system. Of the 284 IPOs 
between Nov. 1989 and Nov. 1993, Amihud et al. (2003) 
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found that tenders based on price were prevalent in 86% of 
the IPOs. Pertinently, Hauser et al. (2006) indicate that until 
1993, tenders on price were bound by a limit on minimum 
and maximum prices. In fact, actual price equaled either 
the minimum or maximum price, aside from a few cases 
where an intermediate price was set. As of Dec. 1993, the 
Israel Securities Authority prohibited the fi xing of maximum 
prices. This decision stemmed from the accumulation of 
maximum price offerings that resulted in investors gaining 
a small portion of the orders which reached an all time high 
in 1993 (Amihud et al., 2003). This regulatory decision 
enabled, in turn, the research of maximum price effects on 
the results of issue and first-day yields. However small, 
following the removal of maximum price, underpriced 
offerings still yielded positive fi rst-day yields (4.6%).
4. Method
4.1. Data
Data for this study are based on fi rms that were engaged in 
IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1 January 1998 
and 30 April 2006 as specifi ed by the Stock Market Authority. 
The sampled period was divided into two well characteri-
zed sub-periods in terms of the share market in Israel and 
IPO characteristics at the time.
The 1998-2000 period, or the ‘Hi-Tech Bubble’, was cha-
racterized by infl ated prices and a relatively high number of 
start ups partaking in issue, 58% as opposed to 36% in the 
preceding period. The repercussions of the hi-tech bubble 
were severe, such that until the end of 2003 only fi ve IPOs 
were carried out as opposed to 33 in 2000 and 19 in 2004. 
During the sampled period, 122 IPOs were carried out, of 
which we had full information on 111 (Table 1).
4.2. Model and estimation
Data analyses for each issuance refer to two periods; fi rst 
trading day or fi rst-day yield and annual yield. 
First day yield was calculated according to equation (1) 
below; as the yield between the price determined at issue 
and the price of the issue unit’s overall closure at the end of 
the fi rst trading day adjusted to the shares index.
 (1)
 
price1
price2
RE1 = −−−−−−−− − 1 
 index1
index2
4.2.1. Yearly yield
Yearly yield is calculated according to equation 2 below, 
based on buying a share at the end of the fi rst trading day 
and holding on to it for a year adjusted to the share index.
 (2)
 
price365
price1
RE365 = −−−−−−−− − 
1 
 index365
index1
4.3. Adjusting to the share index
The yields measured (fi rst-day and yearly) are adjusted to 
the Israeli capital market performance in order to neutralize 
exogenous effects that included the entire market and not 
unique to fi rms issuing for the fi rst time. The General Share 
Index provides the best approximation. 46% of the fi rms may 
be regarded as hi-tech associated with the Tel-Tech. This 
index includes all hi-tech fi rms whose market capitalization 
was higher than 80 million NIS. The high concentration of 
fi rms from one industry implies that the results are liable to 
be biased owing to industry effect. A comparison between 
hi-tech fi rms and all the rest is shown in fi gure 1 in which 
the Tel-Tech and the General Share Index are compared. 
Both indices differ between 1999-2001 and 2004-2006. To 
overcome this bias and on top of evaluating fi rst-day and 
yearly yields by adjusting to the General Share Index, we 
further checked the yields of firms unaffiliated with the 
hi-tech industry by adjustment to the General Share Index 
and hi-tech fi rms were adjusted to the Tel-Tech Index. We 
did not adjust the entire sample to the corresponding 
industry indices because several industries did not have 
specifi c indices and the relatively low number of non-hi-tech 
fi rms in our sample. 
Table 1 IPOs between 1998-2000 by years and the number 
of IPOs
Year Total number of IPOs IPOs in sample
1998 14 12
1999 12 11
2000 33 29
2001  1  1
2002  2  1
2003  2  1
2004 20 19
2005 25 25
2006 37 12
Data (IPOs excluded from the sample owing to incomplete 
data) were drawn from the fi rms’ fi nancial reports, results 
of issue, prospectuses and data of trade in  securities at TASE. 
Trading data; Courtesy of Paradicta and Yifat.
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Figure 1 The General Share Index and the Tel-Tech Share In-
dex 1/1/98-30/4/06.
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4.4. Data analysis
Table 2 presents mean and standard deviation of yields for 
the 1998-2000 and 2001-2006 periods.
Initial examination of the results indicates that for the 
period 1998-2000, the findings are commensurate with 
previous studies, e.g. excess yield for the first-day and 
underperforming yearly yield, compared with the market 
yield (cf. Elliot & Schaub, 2008). The opposite applies to the 
2001-2006 period when the fi rst-day yield is negative, whilst 
the yearly yield is 10.5%. Correspondingly, the standard 
deviation of the fi rst-day yield is small as opposed to higher 
STD for the yearly yield. 
Mean yearly yield for 1998-2000 under performed by -33%. 
Mean yearly yield for 2001-2006 showed an excess of 10.5% 
contrary to previous studies. After adjusting the hi-tech 
fi rms’ yield to the Tel-Tech Index, the mean fi rst-day yield 
remained identical for the entire sample, but the yearly 
yield improved from underperformance of −33.3% between 
1998-2000 to −12%. The excess yearly yield between 2001- 
2006 grew from 10.5% to 17.2%. The mean yearly yield for 
the entire sample grew from underperformance of −10% to 
an excess yield of 3.6%, contrary to most reported fi ndings 
in the literature. 
The highest fi rst-day yield was recorded in 1999 (8.5%) 
prior to the bubble as opposed to a much lower yield of 1.4% 
in 2000. Underperformance was recorded after 2000 
(−1.4%-−3.4%) with a minute excess yield of 0.4% in 2006. 
5. Econometric estimation - fi rst day yield
We estimated two equations. In the first equation, the 
dependent variable was daily yield of stocks engaged in 
IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1 January 
1998 and 30 April 2006, adjusted to the shares index 
(Re1). In the second equation, hi-tech stocks engaged in 
IPOs were adjusted to the High-Tech Share Index whilst 
the rest of the stocks were adjusted to General Shares 
Index (Re1_hi).
After examining several versions and removing non-signi-
fi cant variables (at 10% level of signifi cance) we reached 
estimation results presented in table 3 below:
Surprisingly, the dummy variable for the 1998-2000 issue 
and the dummy 2001-2006 issue were not found to be signi-
fi cant. This despite the fact that average market yield diffe-
red markedly within the two time periods. 
We examined several companies’ characteristics as expla-
natory variables, but found that only companies’ share capi-
tal proved statistically signifi cant. We also examined funds 
Table 3 Regression results — fi rst day return R2
Re1 Re1_hi
Variable Coeffi cient Prob. Coeffi cient Prob.
C 0.022515 0.4287 0.025601 0.3793
FIX 0.057768 0.0578 0.070378 0.0308
HI_TECH 0.035031 0.0753 0.036034 0.0713
INDEX 30 0.392109 0.0881 0.428915 0.0677
UNDERWRITER_FEE −0.62618 0.0029 −0.649128 0.0025
OVER 0.005276 0 0.004996 0.0001
OVER2 0.092858 0 0.093347 0.0000
PRICE −0.039388 0.0114 −0.039598 0.0091
CAPITAL 0.249847 0.0408 0.253406 0.0405
SUM_RAISED −0.293167 0.0596 −0.295894 0.0649
R2 0.48652 0.486911
R2 adjusted 0.441213 0.441638
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Signifi cant explanatory variables:
Fix — issuances of stocks were carried out at a fi xed-price tender (Dummy variable).
HI_TECH — stocks belong to high tech sector (Dummy variable).
Index30 — General share index yield in last month.
UNDERWRITER_FEE —underwriter fee divided by overall immediate yield (Dummy variable). 
OVER — Over underwriting of issuance (Dummy variable).
OVER2 — more than double underwriting of issuance (Dummy variable).
PRICE — Price of issued unit.
Capital — Companies’ Share Capital.
SUM_RAISED — Funds raised.
Table 2 Average fi rst-day and yearly yields adjusted 
to the General Stock Index 1/1998-4/2006
Years Number First-day Yearly
 
of fi rms
Mean STD Mean STD
1998-2000  52  1.8% 1.22 −33.3%  6.21
2001-2006  59 −1.2% 0.39  10.5% 11.41
1998-2006 111  0.2% 1.63   −10% 22.93
STD, standard deviation.
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raised relative to total assets and relative to share capital, 
but they too were not proved statistically signifi cant. 
The dummy variable representing the participation of insti-
tutional investors at the issue was not found to be signifi cant. 
Our fi ndings show that factors effecting positively fi rst-day 
yield are fixed-price tender, high-tech companies’ issue, 
last month general index yield, underwriting issue, and 
companies’ share capital, while factors affecting negatively 
fi rst-day yield are underwriter fee, price of issue unit and 
sum raised. 
6. Econometric estimation - yearly yield
As in the case of the fi rst-day yield, we estimated two equa-
tions. In the fi rst equation’ the dependent variable is the 
yearly yield of stocks engaged in IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (hereafter TASE) between 1 January 1998 and 30 
April 2006 adjusted to the shares index (re365). In the se-
cond equation, hi-tech stocks engaged in IPOs were adjus-
ted to the High-Tech Share Index whilst the rest of stocks 
were adjusted to General Shares Index (re365_hi).
Following several iterations and removing non-signifi cant 
variables (at 10% level), we reached the estimation results 
presented in table 4 below.
We examined several companies’ characteristics as expla-
natory variables but only Return on Equity (RoE) was found 
to be signifi cant. 
Underwriting fee, the number of underwriters, a dummy 
variable representing issue between 2001 -2006, and a 
dummy variable representing issue of mixed units were not 
found to be signifi cant. 
Our fi ndings show that factors affecting fi rst year yield 
positively are underwriters, partial underwriting (inability 
to underwrite all units), whilst factors affecting negatively 
fi rst-year yield are issue between 1998-2000 and RoE. 
7. Summary
The literature addressing IPO’s shows that when a company 
fi rst becomes public, it offers its shares to the public at re-
duced prices which, on average, results in excess return on 
the fi rst-day of trade compared to the market, and on the 
other hand, defi cient return in the long-run.
The literature concerning Israel’s IPO indicates a declining 
tendency in fi rst-day returns from an excess return of 42% 
during the 1980’s to 12% in the early 1990’s which continues 
to decline until reaching an excess return of approximately 
4.6% in the late 1990’s. 
This paper is the fi rst to examine the IPO market in Israel 
between 1998 -2006. During 2001-2006, the average fi rst-day 
returns resulted in a defi cit return of −1.2% and the average 
one-year return resulted in an excess return of 10.5%, con-
trary to the conventional returns reported in the literature. 
The fi rst-day return for the entire period amounted to an 
excess of 1.2% and the average one-year return for the enti-
re period of the sample resulted in a defi cit return of −10%.
The high concentration of Hi-Tech companies raised the 
possibility of diverting the industry. In order to address this 
diversion, additional testing was conducted where returns of 
companies outside the high-tech industry were adjusted to 
the General Share Index and the returns of companies inclu-
ded in the Hi-Tech industry were adjusted to the Tel-Tech 
Index. After adjusting the returns of the H-Tech companies 
to the Tel-Tech Index, the average fi rst-day return remained 
identical for the entire sample, yet the one-year return im-
proved continuously overtime — from a deficit return of 
−33.3% in 1998-2000 to −12% in 2001-2006 and the excess 
Table 4 Regression results — One year return
re365_hi re365
Variable b p b p
C 0.078227 0.1543 0.050877 0.5284
RE1 −0.572160 0.0753
RE1_HI −0.802939 0.0574
PRE −0.479679 0.0000 −0.427224 0.0002
UNDERWRITER_
CONNECTED
0.205025 0.0323 0.294792 0.0194
UNDER 0.629728 0.0086 0.647616 0.0388
ROE −0.062943 0.0259 −0.114464 0.0022
HI_TECH 0.266817 0.0115
R2 0.356510 0.276142
R2 adjusted 0.325868 0.234381
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000006
Signifi cant explanatory variables:
RE1 — First day yield. 
RE1-HI — First day yield (in the second equation).
PRE — issuance at 1998-2000 (Dummy variable).
UNDERWRITER_CONNECTED — underwriters are connected to the company (Dummy variable).
UNDER - partial underwriting (Dummy variable).
ROE — Return on equity.
HI_TECH — stocks belong to high tech sector (Dummy variable).
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one-year return during 2001-2006 increased from 10.5% to 
17.2%. The average one-year return for the entire sample 
increased from defi cit returns of −10% to an excess return of 
3.6%, contrary to most fi ndings reported in the literature. 
We econometrically estimated the relationship between 
the yields (fi rst-day and yearly) and various company-rela-
ted explanatory variables and to market activities.
First-year yield was found to increase with underwriters 
associated with the company and with partial under-
writing (inability to underwrite all units), whilst factors 
affecting negatively over yearly yield are issuance at 
1998-2000 and ROE, a rather surprising fi nding. 
The fi ndings show that fi rst-day yield is positively affected 
by the fi xed-price tender, issue of hi-tech fi rms, General In-
dex yield in the last month, over underwriting of issuance, 
and the companies’ share capital, while factors resulting in 
negative effect over the fi rst day yield are underwriter fee, 
price of issue unit and the sum raised.
We found that contrary to previous studies addressing the 
Israeli IPO market and studies addressing a broad range of 
international markets, underpricing is not found in this stu-
dy. This we believe may be explicated by several factors. 
First, the Israeli money market has been structurally refor-
med over the past decade. Banks are no longer allowed by 
the regulator to manage pension, provident and mutual 
funds and notably underwriting. In addition, the reform 
equalized tax rates over local and foreign fi nancial inves-
tments, which largely increased competition at the stock 
market. Second, the Israel’s industrial structure differs 
markedly from most other developed economies specifi ca-
lly owing to a disproportionately high number of hi-tech 
and R&D-intensive fi rms. A fair number of the fi rms, chiefl y 
hi-tech, are sold in-turn to global companies at high returns 
and therefore pricing is higher at the issue. 
Third, most Israeli IPO’s are characterized by excess un-
derwriting which might positively affect the price. 
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